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comparative perspective. The supplier relations in Japan, particularly automobile
industry, are examined in comparison with those in the United States. The primary
purpose of the study is to characterize significant features of Japanese supplier relations
and to provide economic rationale for those relationships. In addition, comparing
supplier relations in Japan and the U.S., convergence in the nature of those are
discussed. Significant features of Japanese supplier relations are characterized: long-
term relationships and commitments; forced competition among few suppliers;
transaction-specific investments in plant, equipment, and human capital; significant
involvement of suppliers in product development with sharing of information. Supplier
relations in the U.S. are changing and moving close to the Japanese counterpart. There
has been a limited, yet noticeable, convergence in the nature of U.S. and Japanese
supplier relations.
Keywords:  Long-term relationships; Procurement; Supplier relations; Transaction-
specific investments;
JEL Classification: L14; L623
1 Introduction
Supplier relations are important areas for any firm that subcontracts portions of
components and production because this creates the opportunity to enhance values of
products and efficiency of production. There have been significant differences in supplier
relations between Japan and the United States. U.S. automakers are more vertically
integrated than their Japanese counterparts  (Dyer, 1996a).
1  Even though U.S.
automakers are more vertically integrated, they contract directly with more than one
thousand suppliers for the parts they do not make. Product development process is
heavily influenced by the traditional system in which suppliers produce parts under
short-term, arm ’ s-length contracts and have little role in design and engineering. Most
high value-added component development and production are done by U.S. automakers
in-house using large in-house supply capability. Outside suppliers are used
predominately as low-cost manufacturing platforms that are handed blueprints. Vertical
integration might enable companies to enjoy all of the benefits of fewer direct suppliers
and specific investments. But vertical integration removes suppliers from the discipline
of the market and essentially eliminates competition because suppliers have a captive
customer base. Incentives that keep both automakers and suppliers efficient and focused
on continuous improvement are weak in the U.S. supplier relations.
  Japanese automakers, by contrast, work with approximately one-tenth that number,
purchasing more entire subsystems from each supplier.
2 Japanese supplier network is
organized into clearly defined, hierarchical tiers with relatively large first-tier suppliers at
the top taking most of the responsibility for design of subsystems and delegating
responsibilities for simple parts to second and lower-tier suppliers that generally build
parts according to blueprints provided to them. In Japanese supplier relations, suppliers,
particularly primary ones are an integral part of the product development and
manufacturing processes: they are heavily involved, assume significant responsibility,
and communicate extensively and directly with product and process engineers. Japanese
suppliers frequently play a significant role in designing, prototyping, and testing complex
parts and subsystems than U.S. suppliers do. Suppliers in Japan are given great
autonomy in designing, prototyping, and testing their components or subsystems. Both
automakers and suppliers have recognized the need to be interdependent and have
responded by developing mechanisms to cooperate under the discipline of the market.
                                                  
1Dyer (1996a) examines the relationship between inter-firm asset specificity and performance in Japanese
and the U.S. automobile industry. The unit of analysis is the supplier-automaker relationship. The sample
consists of two Japanese, three U.S. automakers. A half of sample is from partner relations, the other is
from arms-length relations in supplier-automaker relations. The survey was conducted with mailed, self-
administered questionnaire. The survey also shows significant differences between two countries with
regard to vertical integration.
2 Cusumano and Takeishi (1995) review the literature in empirical studies on supplier relations in Japan
and腀the U.S.4
  Supplier relations in Japan can be characterized to have distinctive characteristics in
several aspects compared with the U.S. counterpart. It is important to understand how
efficiently Japanese supplier relations work, and whether the Japanese practices are
unique to the peculiar circumstances of the Japanese social and cultural system or
whether it can be applied in other countries. Furthermore, it is also important to
understand the economic rationale of supplier relations in Japan. Yet many aspects are
still left unknown about the process that unfolds between buyers and suppliers in Japan
or the U.S.
This paper describes major characteristics of Japanese supplier relations in a
comparative perspective. The supplier relations in Japan, particularly  in  automobile
industry, are examined in comparison with those in the U.S. The primary purpose of the
study is to characterize significant features of Japanese supplier relations and to provide
economic rationale for those relationships. In addition, comparing supplier relations in
Japan and the U.S., convergence in the nature of those are discussed.
  In this paper, significant features of Japanese supplier relations are characterized.
First, long-term relationships and commitments with close communication reduce
transaction costs and eliminate inefficiencies between automaker and supplier. The
practices of building trust like supplier-assistance programs, cross-share holdings, and
interfirm employee transfer and having guest engineers can work effectively to create a
high degree of mutual trust.
  Second,  forced competition among few suppliers  is effective in  focusing on costs,
quality, and technological development. Using few suppliers can create value by
providing economies of scale and benefits of experience curve that reduce both
transaction and production costs. Moreover, the contest among few suppliers serves to
make the supplier ’ s reward dependent on his rivals ’  efforts as well as his own, while the
reward is actually independent of the supplier ’ s cost. Japanese automakers can increase
incentive of suppliers for enhancing efficiency of production through contests.
Third,  willingness to make significant transaction-specific investments in plant,
equipment, and human capital as well as to share valuable technical information is more
significant in Japanese supplier relations than the U.S. Automakers and suppliers may
choose to seek efficiency advantages by investing in transaction-specific assets. These
transaction-specific assets as the vehicle through which trading partners are able to
generate relational quasi rents when trade partners have developed safeguards which
can control opportunism at relatively low cost and task activities are characterized by a
highly degree of interdependence. In Japanese supplier relations, mutual investment in
specific assets creates incentives to cooperate, and the reduction in cost and
improvements in quality that are gained through the cooperation outweigh the risks of
opportunistic behavior from the parties involved.5
  Fourth, significant involvement of suppliers in product development with intensive and
regular sharing of technical and cost information improves performance and reduces
costs.  Japanese supplier relations involve intense and frequent sharing information
during the product development stage. The intense and regular sharing of technical
information can be effective to improve performance and reduce cost. The long-term
automaker-supplier relationships can facilitate the quality and efficiency of information
exchange. Aggressive target prices are a major factor in driving supplier to reduce cost so
they can make a profit at the price dictated by the customer. Since Japanese automakers
also know the cost structure of their suppliers, they generally set the target price very
aggressively under the assumption that suppliers will continually reduce costs over
experiences of the previous model. The supplier has a great incentive to design the part
so it can meet that price and still make a profit in the long run.
  Supplier relations in the U.S. are changing rapidly and are moving close to those in
Japan. There has been a limited, yet noticeable, convergence in the nature of U.S. and
Japanese supplier relations. In the U.S., suppliers are significantly more likely than they
were in 1980s to provide detailed information to their customers,  have long-term
contracts, and get involved in product development and manufacturing processes. These
results indicate progress toward collaborative relationships, in which suppliers play an
important role in solving problems and developing ideas about products and
manufacturing processes.
  This paper is organized as follows. Major characteristics of Japanese supplier relations
are discussed in order. The next section presents transaction relationships with few
direct suppliers. Section 3 discusses forced competition among limited suppliers. Section
4 describes transaction-specific investments. Section 5 discusses supplier involvement
in product development. Section 6 discusses the convergence in the nature of supplier
relations in Japan and the U.S. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
2 Fewer Direct Suppliers
2.1 Long-term Commitments
U.S. automakers are more vertically integrated than their Japanese counterparts. Even
though U.S. automakers are more vertically integrated, they contract directly with 1,500
to 3,000 parts suppliers for the parts they do not make. Toyota, by contrast, works with
approximately one-tenth that number, buying more entire subsystems from each
supplier. Reducing the total number of direct suppliers can lower costs while increasing
quality. Using fewer suppliers can create value by providing economies of scale and
benefits of experience curve that reduce both transaction and production costs.
Transaction costs, as defined here, are all the costs associated with effecting an exchange,
that is, information gathering and analysis, negotiation, contacting, physical distribution6
costs, and so on.
Within most industries, as cumulative production experience in producing a product
or service increases, quality is improved and costs are reduced. Japanese automakers
have consolidated their business with a few highly efficient suppliers and created
conditions that facilitate the suppliers to make the investments necessary to accelerate
down the experience curve and to share the full advantage of this volume with the
automakers. When a Japanese supplier wins a contract with  a Japanese major
automaker, it is essentially guaranteed four years of business or the life of the model.
Moreover, if the supplier performs up to expectations, it can usually renew the contract
for the next model as well. Naturally, these practices encourage long-term and
transaction-specific investments. Suppliers can invest in developing ideas and plans for
the next model well in advance. Engineers from the limited suppliers have long-term
experiences in working together, making it easier to efficiently develop designs for the
next model. When the model change occurs, suppliers continue to move down the
experience curve (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993).
  In contrast, U.S. automakers have attempted to keep input prices low by maintaining
size and bargaining power over suppliers. By splitting their business among many
suppliers and rotating them frequently, U.S. automakers have repeatedly destroyed the
experience curves of suppliers by ensuring that no one supplier could  enjoy the
experience curve effects to accumulate decisive cost advantage. Thus, the U.S. suppliers
have not developed long-term relationships and experiences with automakers. Moreover,
they are unable to effectively plan long-term production and investments, which is
reflected in lower average plant capacity utilization. Without long-term commitment, U.S.
suppliers can not have incentives enough to make long-term investments in capital
equipment, particularly transaction-specific assets.  Moreover, without the ability to
make long-term forecasts, it is very difficult to make maximum use of capacity and
capital equipment. For example, automakers may involve suppliers to a greater degree in
the product design process to utilize fully the value of present tools and equipment. In
this way, the risk of tool obsolescence due to unilateral design changes is lowered.
Naturally, the longer the automaker and  the supplier work together under these
circumstances, the more likely it is for mutual trust to be developed. Trust in this case
comes from reliability demonstrated over repeated interactions, as well as the shared
knowledge that the parties need one another.
2.2 Building Trust
Trust is an expectation held by an agent that its trading partner would behave in a
mutually acceptable manner including an expectation that neither party will exploit the
other ’ s  vulnerabilities. This expectation  calibrates the set of possible actions, thus7
reducing the uncertainty surrounding the partner’ s actions. The Japanese companies
have recognized the need to be interdependent and have responded by developing
facilitating mechanisms  to  build  mutual  trust. The Japanese do not rely on legal
contracts heavily to protect their interests in trading relationships. Sako (1991) and
Smitka (1991) argue that developing mechanisms to build trust between suppliers and
customers have been critical in attenuating the hazards of opportunism in Japan.
  Sako and Helper (1998) define trust as goodwill trust, that is, suppliers can rely on
their automakers to help them in ways not required by their agreement with customers.
Then, they find that Japanese suppliers were more trusting their customers than U.S.
suppliers.
3 Japanese suppliers tend to entertain a higher level of trust and a lower level of
opportunism than U.S. suppliers do.
4 Helps and technical assistance of automakers are
significant in enhancing trust in Japan but not by in the U.S. Major Japanese
automakers help their supplier match competitors’  efforts if one of competitive suppliers
offered a lower price for a product of same quality. Furthermore, the automakers provide
significant helps for suppliers to reduce costs if their material costs raised. Japanese
suppliers receive technical assistance from their automakers. Automaker engineers visit
supplier site to aid in implementing improved procedures and processes of product
development and production. Automakers provide opportunities to train personnel of
supplier at automakers ’  sites.
  Major Japanese automakers have large supplier-assistance management consulting
groups with specialized expertise that work full time with suppliers to help them improve
their production techniques and achieve total quality, cost, and delivery.  They have
engaged in disseminating technical and management techniques such as TQC (total
quality control), VA (value analysis), VE (value engineering), JIT (just-in-time) production
method, and so on. Providing assistance to suppliers is a highly effective method for both
helping and forcing suppliers to continuously innovate and improve to stay ahead of the
competition.
5
The practice of long-term employment within one firm is important in developing trust
                                                  
3 Sako and Helper (1998) collected data by questionnaire survey during 1993 from 675 first-tier automobile
component suppliers in the U.S. and 472 first-tier suppliers in Japan. Respondents were asked to answer
the questionnaire for their most important customer regarding one product which was typically of their
company’s output and with they were familiar.
4 Dyer (1996a) shows that Japanese supplier were more likely to trust Japanese automakers to treat them
fairly and more willing to make dedicated investments based on oral agreements.
5 Suppliers often feel indebted or obligated to the automakers, but they also have mixed feelings about the
system. On the one hand, they sometimes feel that sharing the business with another supplier is
inappropriate when they are clearly ahead in both cost and quality. Moreover, they have to share not only
the business but also information or technology in order to help their competitor improve. On the other
hand, since they realize that someday they may need such assistance, they view the system as insurance.
Toyota suppliers rarely go bankrupt because they receive helps from Toyota if they are in financial distress.
Only suppliers that are unwilling or unable to improve continuously are cut off completely, and suppliers
will do almost anything to avoid such damage to their reputations8
among individuals both within the firm as well as across firms. There is real personal
contract between the purchasing managers of manufactures and the managers or owner
of a supplying firm. Because people can develop long-term relationships with their
counterparts at the supplier or buyer, it is natural that the Japanese have developed
significantly greater trust across firms.
  The way that Japanese firms build trust is by requiring career paths in which
employees transfer from firm to firm. Employee transfers, both temporary and
permanent, are common among business partners, particularly between large
manufacturers and their subcontractors. In addition to permanent and temporary
employee exchanges, suppliers often send guest engineers to work at their customer
technical centers on an ongoing basis. Supplier and automaker engineers work jointly
designing the components for a new car model.
6 Not only do these career-path help build
trust between firms, but also transferred and guest employees are better able to
understand how to enhance the efficiency of the development and production processes
because they know both buyer and supplier operations. Direct contact is much more
important than other forms of contact in developing ways for employees to know and
trust each other. Both of automakers and suppliers encourage a considerable amount of
face-to-face contact between supplier salespeople and automaker engineers and between
automaker purchasing agents and supplier engineers. Japanese suppliers engage in
more face-to-face contact and utilize more guest engineers than do U.S. automaker parts
divisions and assembly divisions (Dyer, 1996a).
  Companies need credible commitments if they are going to be willing to make
customized investments. Cross-share holding in Japanese trading relationships
represents commitments that firms have made to each other, and in many ways, it is an
arrangement that is akin to an exchange of hostages (Williamson, 1983).  Japanese
automakers own significant portions of shares of their major suppliers. This ownership
stake builds trust and goal congruence between automakers and their suppliers.
Interlocking stock ownership represents a commitment to the supplier that needs an
incentive to make the customized investment automakers requires. Those suppliers can




3.1 Three Types of Suppliers
                                                  
6 Dyer and Ouchi (1993) find that suppliers send guest engineers to work at their customer technical centers
on an ongoing basis. Toyota had about 350 guest engineers at its main technical center in 1992. These
engineers become a part of the design team and are given desks to the Toyota engineers.
7 Toyota and Nissan own an average of 23 percent of  the stock of subsidiaries or affiliated companies,
whereas U.S. automakers do not own stock in their suppliers in the sampling survey done by Dyer (1996a).9
A supplier typically has contracts with an automaker both for a variety of components in
a single model and for similar components in different models. There are usually several
companies within the automaker ’ s supplier group qualified to manufacture a component.
The other qualified suppliers may be currently producing similar components for other
models. Within an assembler ’ s hierarchical structure of suppliers, there are two basic
types - design approved (DA) suppliers and design supplied (DS) ones (Asanuma, 1985a).
DA suppliers provide both design and production services to the automaker ’ s
specifications while DS suppliers produce a component from drawings provided by the
automaker. DA parts usually include air conditioners, body and instrumental panels,
engines, and transmissions. The survey indicates that DA parts account for 62% of total
components of Japanese automakers in the late 1980s. On the other hand, DS parts
account for 81% in the U.S. automakers in that period. The U.S. automakers have
recently changed to relying more on DA parts (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
  The DA suppliers are usually those with the close and long-term relationships with the
automaker. Most of them are subsidiaries or affiliated companies of the automaker.
First-tier and the DA suppliers have a greater number and more profitable contracts with
the automaker. The automaker usually has less detailed knowledge of the DA supplier ’ s
production costs that give the supplier an advantage in price negotiation. There are many
thousands of suppliers in the automaker ’ s supplier hierarchy and only a few hundred at
the first-tier.
  Third type of supplier is commodity supplier who simply manufactures parts designed
by the automaker, usually standardized parts such as batteries, glasses, and tires. Since
such parts are not customized to a particular automaker, it can be thought close
coordination for that parts may be less important than for other parts. Commodity
suppliers may have long-term relationships with their automakers if the suppliers’
unique manufacturing capabilities make them necessary.
3.2 Supplier Competition for Design and Manufacturing
Cusmano and Takeishi (1991) survey purchasing agents and product planners of the
largest Japanese automakers, US automakers, and the U.S. operations of Japanese
automakers. They find sole sourcing is not uncommon among the U.S. automakers, nor
is multiple sourcing uncommon among the Japanese automakers, though on average the
Japanese use fewer suppliers per part.
8 They also find that suppliers to U.S. firms play a
large role from an apparently early stage in development, though Japanese suppliers still
play a greater role in design. Japanese firms usually employ a multiple sourcing policy to
                                                  
8 Dyer, Cho, and Chu (1998) find exclusive relationships between automakers and suppliers with high level
of interaction in Korean automobile industry.10
force suppliers into intense competition, even though they forgo economies of scale
(Asanuma, 1985b). Japanese automakers are less likely to rely on one supplier than the
U.S. automakers are. On average, each Japanese automaker purchases each part from
approximately three suppliers, and each supplier sells the same part to approximately
three automakers (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1995). They maintain competition so that
one supplier ’ s ability to generate cost or quality improvements provides an incentive for
the other supplier to keep up.
  The typical production cycle for a car model begins with a lengthy design and
development stage followed by a 4-year production stage. The automaker usually invites
several qualified firms in the supplier group to compete for a contract to design and
produce a component for a new model cycle. A DA supplier will undertake the design and
development as well as tooling for production with no guarantee of reimbursement by the
automaker. For DS supplier, the automaker will guarantee reimbursement for specific
investments such as tolling. Whether DA or DS, the automaker makes a firm
commitment to use the supplier for the 4-years production life of the model.
  Recent evidence suggests that although the Japanese companies encourage their
suppliers to make customized investments, they use forced competition with one or two
competitors to make sure that their suppliers are disciplined by the ever-present threat
of competition. This competition often begins at the design stage when the automaker
invites guest engineers from two suppliers to work at the automaker ’ s technical center as
part of the design team. As the design work proceeds, the automaker meets with each
supplier separately to review proprietary ideas and eventually decides which supplier has
superior product design. The losing supplier may become a secondary supplier for that
model or may simply have an opportunity to develop a design for a different model. Liker,
et al. (1996) shows that Japanese suppliers face less competition in the design and
manufacturing stage than U.S. suppliers, though Japanese suppliers do face
considerable competition - about two competitors for a given design and manufacturing
contract on average.
9
  The buyer can strengthen the incentives for cost or quality improvements by making
the price paid to each supplier dependent on relative performance. The second-place
supplier loses out on additional business and the bonus for good performance. However,
the buyer does not abandon a weak supplier, but works with it to help it compete with the
strong suppliers. The forced competition among the limited suppliers can be explained
with the theory of principal-agent. The theory focuses on how a principal may
                                                  
9 Liker, et al (1996) examines supplier involvement in design based on a 1993 survey of approximately 143
Japanese and 189 U.S. automobile component suppliers. The survey was based on mailed, self-
administered questionnaires. Respondents were asked to identify their largest dollar-volume automobile
component or component group. The questions were also to be answered with their largest automobile
customer.11
compensate an agent for works delegated. The theory deals with the design of optimal
compensation scheme in order to motivate an agent to work efficiently under the
situation where an agent ’ s action is not observed perfectly. According to the literature in
the use of contests to compensate multiple agents, contests among the suppliers can
work as a mean for providing incentive to suppliers.
10 The contest serves to make the
supplier ’ s reward dependent on his rivals ’  efforts as well as his own, while the reward is
actually independent of the supplier ’ s cost. It can be shown that contests outperform
individual-agent-incentive schemes in solving the problem in unobservable efforts when
suppliers face some degree of common production uncertainty in addition to their own
uncertainty. Thus, the buyer as a principal can increase incentive of supplier, as an
agent for enhancing efficiency of production through multiple suppliers.
4 Transaction-specific Investments
4.1 Investments in Specific Assets
Automaker-supplier relationships in Japan are characterized long-term and highly
committed, whereas they are more likely to be governed by short-term, arm ’ s-length
relationship in the U.S. One of the major benefits of the Japanese supplier involvement in
design is access to highly customized design with unique features for a particular buyer ’
needs.
Japanese automobile suppliers develop more unique parts for their customers and
make greater investments in specialized assets than U.S. suppliers do. A first-tier
suppliers does not usually receive a separate payment for the investment in tools, dies,
molds, and jigs that are highly customized and would need to be scrapped if the
automaker cut off orders to the supplier. The suppliers ’  specialized capital investments
make them highly dependent on the automakers, with the real possibility of hold-up
problems. However, automakers are also significantly dependent on the suppliers. Most
DA suppliers ’  parts are “ black box,”  meaning that the automaker provides only very
general specifications while the supplier does all of the detailed functional specifications
and blueprints. Consequently, DA suppliers have significantly more knowledge about the
design and manufacture of the part than does the automaker. Because black-box parts
are customized to a specific model, the automaker is highly dependent on the supplier. If
the supplier did not perform as desired, the automaker would have difficulty simply
shifting business to another supplier, given the product ’ s specific nature.
11 Some DA
suppliers claim that they do not provide the automakers with all of the specific functional
                                                  
10 Green and Stokey (1983); Lazear and Rosen (1981); Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) have examined the use of
contests to compensate multiple agents.
11 Most automakers in Japan restrict suppliers to sell design specification to other companies (Fair Trade
Commission in Japan, 1993).12
details when they submit their design drawings for approval, but intentionally leave out
certain important details such as tolerances. Because the automaker does not know the
part ’ s exact design specifications, it is difficult to change suppliers, resulting in the
automaker ’ s dependence on the supplier. Asanuma (1989) argues that the more
technological initiative DA suppliers have, the more likely they are to earn from supplying
relations with automakers. Automakers can respond to it by investing in technological
development or starting in-house development and production, or finding rival
suppliers.
12
  Under these conditions, each party makes commitment with substantial transaction-
specific investments, which creates quasi rents only if the both parties continue working
together. If the relationship is terminated, each party loses some portion of the rent. Thus
these specialized investments create interdependence, which in turn creates incentives
to cooperate. According to transaction cost economics, it may be difficult to specify ex
ante precisely how the assets will be employed in production even if transaction-specific
investments are entirely contractible. Once transaction-specific assets are in place, the
characteristics of the transaction and the gain from trade will be determined by ex post
bargaining between the buyer and the supplier. Highly transaction-specific investment
should be avoided by buying commodities in the market and making customized
products in-house where the hierarchy can be used to reduce transaction costs (Masten,
Meehan, and Snyder, 1989; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1979). By contrast,
Japanese automakers  have  increasingly delegated responsibility for design and
manufacture of more complex subsystems to a close-tied group of suppliers who are
willing to make significant transaction-specific investments in developing customized
parts for the buyers. Moreover, Japanese automakers seem willing to allow suppliers to
development capabilities to receive the long-term advantages of cooperation. In fact,
transaction-specific investment increases mutual dependence if they are made equally
by both parties. Since these specific investments increase the exit costs for a party and
reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior, parties are likely to be comforted and
thus may increase their commitment to each other. This, in turn, creates incentives to
cooperate, and the reduction in cost and improvements in quality that are gained
through the cooperation outweigh the risks of opportunistic behavior from the parties
involved.
  Liker at al. (1996) shows that suppliers have a close and long-term relationship with
                                                  
12 Denso Corp. is one of the major suppliers of electronic components to Toyota. Denso supplied 50% of
Toyota’s total electronic component needs in 1997. Toyota maintains multiple sourcing policy. The second
source can give Toyota the leverage to impose its stringent schedule of cost reduction on the primary
source. But Toyota cannot find rival suppliers of Denso who could serve as alternative sources of
electronics parts. Consequently, it has been decided that Toyota itself must become the rival to avoid
heavy dependence on Denso for electronics (Lincoln, Ahmadjian, and Mason, 1998).13
their largest customer both in Japan and U.S. automobile industry. They also suggest
closer, more long-term relationships in Japan, though these differences are not as large
as expected. It is observed that Japanese automakers have the most dedicated
relationships with subsystem suppliers and the least dedicated with lower-tier suppliers.
Japanese suppliers are considerably more dependent on their largest customer. These
results suggest U.S. automobile companies are as likely as Japanese companies to out-
source design, given suppliers early information about product development, and allow
them to develop unique design capabilities the automakers cannot replicate.
13
4.2 Investments in Customized Assets
Japanese suppliers dedicated some of capital investments to their primary customer that
these customized physical assets that could not be re-deployed if the customer terminate
to purchase from them. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) suggested that dedicated physical
assets play an important role in the improvement of product integrity and thus in overall
product quality. It generally requires various types of investments in customized assets
by one or both firms in order to make the production and physical distribution more
efficient. Dyer and Ouchi (1993) identify three types of customized investments employed
in supplier relationship: (1) site-specific investment; (2) physical investments; (3) human
capital investments.
14
  (1) Site-specific investments: Site specificity refers to the situation whereby successive
production stages that are immobile in nature are located in close proximity to one
another to improve coordination and economize on inventory and transportation costs.
Plants are located so that they are dedicated largely to a particular customer in order to
improve coordination and economize on inventory and transportation costs. Supplier
relations in Japan involves building a supplier plant within fifteen miles of the customer
plant to reduce transportation costs, improve delivery, and generally improve
coordination. It allows supplier engineers to work daily at customer technical centers
with customer engineers in designing new products.
  (2) Physical investments: Manufacturing equipment such as tools, dies, molds, jigs,
machinery, information system and so on is customized. Physical specificity refers to
transaction-specific capital investments. Physical asset specialization allows for
developing unique feature of product and may improve quality by increasing product
integrity.
  (3) Human capital investments: Dedicated design to manufacturing requires engineers
                                                  
13  Korean automakers demand a high degree of loyalty from their suppliers. Suppliers make highly
customized investments and coordinate closely with their automakers (Dyer, Cho, and Chu, 1998).
14 Asanuma (1989) identified that transaction-specific investments are prevalent in supplier relations in
Japan, and developed the notion of “relation-specific skill.14
to develop significant customer-specific knowledge. Human capital specificity refers to
transaction-specific know-how accumulated by trade partners through long-term trading
relationships.
  Mutual human capital increases as trade partners develop experiences working
together and accumulate specialized information, language, and know-how that allows
them to communicate efficiently and effectively. It involves transferring the buyer ’ s
executives or employees to the supplier to work on a temporary or permanent basis, and
sending consultants to work with the supplier to improve production methods,
implement just-in-time delivery systems, or assist in solving other problems.
  Dyer (1996a) shows greater transaction-specific investments are sunk in Japanese
supplier relations than those in the U.S. Japanese automakers are more effective at
coordinating  the supply-production system. Greater mutual human capital gives
Japanese companies the ability to rapidly disseminate information and to improve
interfirm communication, thereby coordination in supplier relations. Japanese suppliers
are much more likely to share key task-related information with automakers, notably
technical information and information on their production costs. Furthermore, Japanese
automakers are providing more information to assist affiliated suppliers in reducing
costs, increasing quality, and improving delivery.
4.3 Relationship between Transaction-specific Investments and Performance
Dyer (1996b) examines the relationship between inter-firm asset specificity and
performance in the automobile industry. The survey consists of two Japanese
automakers and all three U.S. automakers and a sample of their suppliers. The unit of
analysis is the supplier-automaker relationship. Toyota and Nissan ’ s supplier indicated
that approximately 21 percent of their capital equipment investments were not re-
deployable, compared with 20 percent for Ford suppliers, 14 percent for GM suppliers.
On virtually every assets specificity measure, Japanese automakers and their suppliers
were more specialized than their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, with regard to site and
human asset specificity, Toyota ’ s supplier group was more specialized than Nissan ’ s
supplier group. More specifically, it examines the extent to which differences in
supplier-automaker asset specialization may explain performance differences between
Japanese automaker and the U.S. The findings indicate a positive relationship between
supplier-automaker specialization and performance. In particular, the data suggest a
positive relationship between inter-firm human capital specificity and both quality and
new model cycle time. Moreover, site specialization is found to be positively associated
with lower inventory costs. The findings suggest that in the automobile industry a tightly
integrated production network characterized by proximity and a high level of mutual
human capital specificity will outperform a loosely integrated production network15
characterized by low level of inter-firm specificity.
  A firm may choose to seek efficiency advantages by creating assets, which are
specialized in conjunction with the assets of a trading partner. These transaction-specific
assets as the vehicle through which trading partners are able to generate relational quasi
rents. Although investments in specific assets boost productivity, the incentive to make
transaction-specific investments is tempered by the fact that the more specialized a
resource becomes, the lower its value in alternative uses. The contingent value of a
specific resource exposed its owner to a greater risk of opportunism than the owner of
generalized resources. According to the transaction cost economics perspective, if trade
partners make transaction-specific investments, then they must safeguard against the
hazards of opportunism. Source of advantage is contingent on the costs associated with
safeguarding those investments. Transaction-specific investments are more likely to
result in high performance when trade partners have developed safeguards which can
control opportunism at relatively low cost and task activities are characterized by a
highly degree of interdependence.
  It would be misleading to suggest that asset specificity is the only, or even the primary,
factor that contributes to performance differences among automakers. Undoubtedly
numerous other factors not captured in the model contribute to performance differences.
The optimal level of inter-firm asset specificity will depend on the costs of safeguarding
specific investments. If the safeguard costs are particularly high then the gains from
specialization may be outweighed by the costs. The fact that kankei gaisha (affiliated
suppliers) exhibit greater asset specificity than U.S. in-house division is intriguing. Trust
may be a highly effective and low-cost means for safeguarding transaction-specific
investments. One can argue that constraints on opportunism within the Japanese
institutional environment allow Japanese companies to generate relational quasi rents
more effectively (Dyer, 1996b).
  The efficient level of specificity between trading partners is likely to be contingent on
the task activities and degree of interdependence. Generally speaking, the greater the
interdependence, the more both parties will benefit from investments in specialized
assets. The findings suggest that when working activities are highly interdependent as
they are in the automobile industry, the Japanese automakers are more efficient than the
U.S.  These transaction-specific investments create substantial buyer and supplier
switching costs and, once sunk, make the two parties highly interdependence. This
interdependent relationship can create potential contracting problems if the parties do
not completely trust each other. Toyota ’ s just-in-time (JIT) system is a good example of
how customized investments can create value. Just-in-time system was designed to
reduce complexity and costs by eliminating inventories and work in process and to
ensure that there was no redundant buffer stocks, distribution facilities, or quality16
inspections. However, to implement JIT efficiently, Toyota and its suppliers had to make
customized investments in information systems, plants, and flexible manufacturing
systems that created mutual dependency.
5 Supplier Involvement in Product Development
5.1 Suppliers ’  Roles in Product Development
One of the key features of Japanese supplier management is the substantial involvement
of suppliers in product development.  The early involvement of suppliers in product
development is instrumental in reducing  lead-time and avoiding costly production
problems in automakers (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Clark (1989) finds that gains of
Japanese automakers from having close relations with suppliers with superior capability
in product development is a great proportion of unique parts without substantial
increasing their own engineering costs.  Kamath and Liker (1994) examine supplier-
management used in product development practiced by major Japanese automakers.
They observed closely coordinated buyer-supplier relationships in product development.
It is widely believed that Japanese automakers treat virtually all their primary suppliers
who deal directly with the automobile assembler as close partners. In fact, they typically
regard only a handful as partners and assign more limited roles to the rest. Nor do buyers
and suppliers work together in free-flowing teams to develop new products. Rather,
Japanese automakers design their development programs tightly and use targets and
prototypes to keep suppliers in line. Managed correctly, suppliers can help their
automakers reduce lead times and manufacturing costs, and can aid the design process.
  Japanese automakers assign suppliers different roles and give even first-tier suppliers
varying levels of responsibility for the product development. The Japanese hierarchical
structure simplifies communication between buyers and suppliers: first-tier suppliers
coordinate the activities of the second tier and so on down the hierarchy, allowing
customers to focus scarce communication resources on the top tier. Still, with 100 to 200
first-tier suppliers, an automaker cannot easily work with all of them as partners in
product development. Successful partnerships depend on the right balance among
supplier ’ s technological capabilities, an automaker ’ s willingness to share information,
and both companies ’  requirements. There is a range of postures that automakers and
suppliers can adopt within a long-term cooperative relationship. Suppliers may play
different roles for different buyers. Each posture carries fundamentally different
responsibilities during product development, and the automaker-supplier relationships
vary considerably in closeness and intensity.
  Primary suppliers top the hierarchy. These selected first-tier suppliers can also be
thought of as full-service providers and DA suppliers. Primary suppliers are responsible
for entire subsystems such as heating, ventilating and air conditioning. They often17
participate in planning a new model even before the concept stage. Their understanding
of their products and processes are superior to those of their buyers, and they suggest
solutions to meet their buyers ’  price and performance objectives. They do their own
testing and may even be responsible for testing other suppliers ’  parts. One of the major
partners is Denso, which has grown to become an independent supplier of a broad range
of components approaching to Toyota in size.
  One type of DS  suppliers refers to as  a  full-system supplier designing and
manufacturing complex assemblies. Because they lack the technological capabilities of
partners, they have less influence on design. The automaker gives these suppliers critical
specifications for performance, interface requirements and space constraints. These
suppliers then develop the systems on their own. Moreover, these suppliers take on
major testing responsibilities: an automaker might not even verify the test data these
suppliers submit along with its prototype.
  Another type of DS suppliers has even less influence on design specifications. They
may participate as consultants in meetings with the automaker during the concept stage,
but the buyer determines in explicit detail the specifications for the part. The
responsibilities of these suppliers include working out the detailed of the design and
building and testing prototypes. But the automaker often conducts critical tests
internally to assess the performance of the supplier ’ s parts. Communications are not
very intensive in the concept stage but intensify during prototyping, though not to the
same degree as with primary suppliers.
  Commodity suppliers simply manufacture parts designed by the automaker, usually
standard parts. This role is appropriate when a customer chooses to supplement its own
internal ability to design those parts with a commodity supplier ’ s manufacturing
capacity. Commodity-suppliers and their buyers may communicate frequently during
the late-prototype and production-preparation stages, though communication is less
intensive than it is in the other roles. These suppliers may have long-term relationships
with their customers if the suppliers ’  unique manufacturing capabilities make them
necessary or if the automakers ’  just-in-time manufacturing schedules are so tight that
they require them. Suppliers and their customers become increasingly interdependent as
they work together and their trading relationship grows. The buyer depends on the
supplier ’ s know-how and relies on the supplier to deliver on time and on target.
Committed ever more heavily to the customer, the supplier depends on it for its future
business.
  Japanese automakers manage product development tightly. They set clear,
understandable goals and communicate them consistently to suppliers, and they use
targets and prototypes to enforce those goals. It is a simple, rigid process, much like an
assembly line. Suppliers must keep the line moving as a highly regimental role. With a18
highly structured and routinized product-development process, Japanese suppliers
know exactly where they fit in and when, and this arrangement allows them to be
innovative within clearly determined boundaries. Japanese automakers give marching
orders to suppliers through carefully considered targets for price, delivery date,
performance, and space constraints. Then the suppliers go off and design to those targets.
There is usually little room for missing them because a deviation by one supplier will
have implications for designers of mating components systems. Suppliers are expected to
work hard to meet targets on time. Although buyers generally understand if supplier
cannot meet a target, they are unsympathetic if the supplier shows signs that it has not
worked very hard. The automaker is responsible for avoiding arbitrary and capricious
changes in targets, because they would reverberate throughout the system and could
disrupt other suppliers ’  design work.
  Liker, et al. (1996) show that Japanese suppliers have more responsibility and a
greater percent of subsystem suppliers designed parts themselves rather than jointly
with their customer. There is a high level of supplier involvement in product development
in both countries for the early stages of design, particularly among suppliers of major
subsystems.腀Compared to the Japanese, U.S. suppliers are involved as early in the
concept stage, take comparable levels of responsibility for design, analysis, prototyping
and testing; are as likely to influence  the requirements for their component and
communicate even more frequently with their customer in the early stage of design. The
U.S. automakers seem to be giving suppliers the responsibility and opportunities to
exploit advantages of asset specificity and customer dependence on the supplier, without
the same level of control as we see in Japan. They do not hold equity in the supplier, they
do not represent as large a volume of the supplier ’ s sales, they have less internal
capability to design the parts themselves, and they are not repeating supplier ’ s tests as
frequently.  There is no evidence in these data that Japanese suppliers are given greater
responsibility for prototyping in Japan than in the U.S. Nor is there evidence that
Japanese companies expect more complete prototypes and trust their suppliers enough
not to replicate their component test. In fact, there is a significantly greater likelihood in
Japan that supplier prototype tests are replicated. Japanese automakers are closely
monitoring their suppliers ’  design.
  
5.2 Information Sharing in Product Development Stage
The Japanese supplier management suggests suppliers are trusted enough to be given
model information relatively early in the design process - often at the concept or pre-
concept stage - and suppliers, particularly the DA, are expected to participate in the
development, beginning at the concept stage. Japanese DA suppliers wield significant
influence over the process of defining customers ’  requirements so that the product19
designs exploits the suppliers ’  unique manufacturing capabilities. Liker et al. (1996)
indicate that almost all of the subsystem supplier in Japan receive early vehicle concept
information from their customers although they do not necessarily have a great deal of
influences over the setting of specifications for their subsystems. Contrary to the current
literature that suggests Japanese automakers provide broader specifications that allow
the supplier greater freedom to innovate, there were no Japanese-U.S. differences in the
degree of specificity of the customer requirements. Japanese automakers were as likely
as their U.S. counterparts to include actual dimensions in the requirements.
  Japanese automakers provide early new model information to primary suppliers as the
product concept is forming and issue only the minimum critical product requirements.
U.S. automakers are thought to provide much more detailed specifications to their
suppliers, allowing suppliers little latitude on specifying the design. Japanese supplier
management involves intense and frequent communication during the product
development cycle, particularly in the early stages when the product is being defined.
This includes the intense and regular sharing of technical information to improve
performance and reduce cost. Because these are long-term automaker-supplier
relationships, the quality and efficiency of information exchange is significantly higher
than it would be in new relationships. Thus mutual human capital investment enhances
information sharing and communication between automaker and supplier.
  There was considerably more frequent exchange of design information reported in the
U.S. compared to Japan at all tier levels and all stages of the development process. The
frequency of communication does not necessarily reflect the quality of communication.
The Japanese relations have a long and continuous history of working together with their
suppliers on design that they can communicate quickly and easily between them. Direct
communication and relationships developed over a long period of time  have  made
detailed and explicit written communications largely unnecessary. The result of this
emphasis on communication is greater efficiency, faster product-development cycles.
The greater frequency of information exchange about product development between
automakers and suppliers in the U.S. may reflect less effective communication and
decision making. Japanese suppliers are given specifications formally, asking to go off
and do the design and return with a prototype on time. Communication has been
streamlined so it is less frequent than in the U.S. The Japanese supplier relations can be
thought to involve intense and frequent communication during the product development
cycle, particularly in the early stages when the product is being defined. This includes the
intense and regular sharing of technical information to improve quality and reduce cost.
When a supplier gets a notice that the concept session for a specific vehicle model is
being scheduled, there is no ambiguity about what the supplier must bring to the
session; approximately when the first, second, and third prototypes will be due; and what20
the buyer ’ s expectations at each of those milestone events will be. One can find clear and
consistent communication between suppliers and automakers in the Japanese relations.
5.3 Cost-reducing Efforts
Japanese automakers use a prolonged target-setting process to further explore the
design and improve cost and quality. For example, Toyota gives them targets shortly after
the 36-month presentation. Usually, maximum/minimum targets are generally
expressed in terms of improvements over an existing product or the prototype in the
presentation: Toyota is likely to want about 4 percent reduction in cost, or about 5
percent improvement in power output. During the months that follow, the suppliers
diligently strive to meet the targets through design improvements. If the targets are met
or exceeded, this eventually becomes the specification; if not, in negotiations, the
supplier demonstrates with test data that the target is impossible, and the both parties
compromise on a target. Toyota ’ s engineers typically set targets on each component
higher than really necessary by as much as 20 percent. They realize that, with
production variations, this ensures a comfort zone so parts out of tolerance will actually
be quality parts. They also want the suppliers to stretch; if the targets are too easy, the
supplier will relax and not try to continuously push possible boundaries. If the supplier
cannot achieve the very challenging goal, there is still room for negotiation (Ward, et al.,
1995).
  Along with specifications for a component, Japanese automaker gives suppliers a
target price (Asanuma, 1988b). The automaker decides what price the market will bear
for the total vehicle and works back, roughly allocating costs to major subsystems and
components. It then gives that cost to the supplier as a target at the beginning of the
design process.  When the Japanese automaker hands design specifications to its
suppliers, these specifications include a target price, whereas U.S. automobile
companies tend to rely more on direct market forces to control costs. Aggressive target
prices are a major factor in driving supplier to use value engineering and reduce cost so
they can make a profit at the price dictated by the customer. In fact, Japanese
automakers also know the cost structure of their suppliers and generally set the target
price very aggressively under the assumption that suppliers will continually reduce costs
over experiences of the previous model. Supplier which are dependent on a principal
customer have no choice but to reduce cost aggressively or risk losing the affiliation with
that customer which could mean going out of business.  The supplier has a great
incentive to design the part so it can meet that price and still make a profit. Although
there seems to be less flexibility in the target prices, there is much greater opportunity to
explicitly consider trade-off between cost, performance in the early design stage (Ward, et
al., 1995).21
  Liker, et al. (1996) shows the date to support the more widespread use of target pricing
in Japan and the greater prevalence of competitive bidding in the U.S. However, there is
also considerable evidence that U.S. automakers are using target pricing. More than half
of both the U.S. and Japanese suppliers said the use of competitive bids was a major way
to set prices. Value engineering has become an institutionalized practice in these
companies. The term used for identifying ways to reduce cost in the product/process
development stage is value engineering. In fact each buyer has a formula for splitting the
cost saving suppliers have achieved through value engineering between the customer
and suppliers.
6 Convergence
Supplier relations in the U.S. are changing rapidly and are moving close to those in
Japan. Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) present the results of a questionnaire survey to a
sample of automobile manufactures in the U.S. and Japan during the spring of 1990. The
survey provides evidence that U.S. automakers and suppliers have adopted at least some
practices traditionally associated with the Japanese, thus indicating a possible
convergence toward the Japanese supplier relations. The evidence shows that U.S.
automakers appeared to move close to the Japanese model during the 1980s in several
areas.  It is found that decreases in the number of suppliers per part for the U.S
automakers during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
  Liker, at al (1996) find little support for the expected differences between Japanese and
the U.S. automakers in supplier involvement in the design process. U.S. automakers
have been increasing levels of supplier involvement in product development rivaling the
Japanese. U. S. automakers are as likely as the Japanese to be more dependent on
suppliers in design, give suppliers early information about product development, and
allow them to develop unique design capabilities that automakers cannot replicate.
  Once contracts were short-term, arm ’ s-length relationships, now contracts have
increasingly become long-term  in the U.S. Helper and Sako (1995) shows that U.S.
suppliers provide buyers with detailed information about their processes, and buyers
talk of partnerships with their suppliers. 87 percent of Japanese suppliers, compared
with 68 percent of U.S. companies, thought that their customer ’ s commitment would last
more than four years, the typical duration of a model cycle. The actual record of trading
with the same customer was significantly longer in Japan than in the United States.
  In the U.S., more suppliers provided their customers with a detailed breakdown of the
steps in their production process, an increase that is compatible with a trend toward22
collaborative relationships between 1984 and 1993.
15 More and more U.S. suppliers have
given their customers a detailed breakdown of process steps, so that the gap between U.S.
and Japanese companies was eliminated by 1993 in this respect. At the same time,
automaker commitment, measured by either past record or suppliers ’  future projections,
remains higher in Japan than in the U.S. In joint problem solving, suppliers ’
expectations of cooperation have increased in the U.S. but declined in Japan. In the U.S.,
suppliers are significantly more likely than they were five years ago to provide detailed
information to their customers, have long-term contracts, believe that their customers
are serious about product quality, and have defect-prevention systems in place.
16 These
results indicate progress toward cooperative relationships, in which suppliers play an
important role in solving problems and developing new ideas about products and
processes. Despite the movement toward the Japanese supplier relations in the U.S.,
suppliers with U.S. automakers do not feel that their customers are more trustworthy
than were five years ago, do not receive much assistance from them in reducing costs or
adopting new technology. One of the reasons behind seemingly contradictory trends can
be the significant differences in purchasing policy among U.S. automakers. Therefore,
there has been a limited, yet noticeable, convergence in the nature of U.S. and Japanese
supplier relations.
  Sako and Helper (1995) also show that there has been a considerable convergence in
the methods of supplier relations towards those consistent with closer and longer-term
relationships in Europe, the U.S. and Japan.
17An increasing proportion of European and
U.S. suppliers have provided their customer with a detailed breakdown of process steps,
so that the gap between European and the U.S. on the one hand and Japan on the other
in this respect is eliminated by 1994. At the same time, customer commitment, measured
either by past record or by supplier ’ s future projection, remains higher in Japan than in
Europe or the U.S. Suppliers ’  expectations of joint problem-solving have increased in
                                                  
15 Frey and Schlosser (1993) present a case of the Ford-ABB Oakville paint-finishing project that shows how
cooperative and innovative buyer-supplier relationships can be achieved in the U.S. automobile industry.
16 Helper (1991) conducts survey of U.S. automobile suppliers and finds that automakers have increased the
length of the contracts they offer, and suppliers are more likely to provide process information. However,
suppliers still feel a lack of automaker commitment, since their level of trust in the automaker does not
increase. Suppliers do not receive much assistance in reducing costs or adopting new technology. Moreover,
performance improvements often come at the suppliers’ expenses.
17 Sako and Helper (1995) conducts mail survey of first-tier parts suppliers in the U.S., Japan, and Europe
during the period 1993-94. The findings are from responses from 1416 suppliers.23
Europe and the U.S. but declined in Japan.
18
7 Conclusion
Supplier relations are important areas for any firm that subcontracts portions of
component design and production because this contributes to enhance value of product
and efficiency of production. There have been significant differences in supplier relations
between Japan and the U.S. Supplier relations in Japan can be described to have
distinctive characteristics in several aspects compared with the U.S. counterpart. It is
important to understand how efficiently Japanese supplier relations work and whether it
can be applied in other countries. Furthermore, it is also important to understand the
economic rationale of supplier relations in Japan.
  In this paper, major characteristics of Japanese supplier relations are described in
comparison with  those of  the U.S. Economic rationale for those relationships are
provided. Furthermore, comparing supplier relations in Japan and the U.S., convergence
in the nature of those are discussed. Significant features of Japanese supplier relations
are characterized as follows: (1) long-term relationships and commitments with frequent
planned communication, which reduced transaction costs between buyer and supplier;
trust-building practices like supplier-assistance programs, owning stock, and keeping
employees ’  personal ties that create a high degree of mutual trust; (2) forced competition
among few suppliers focusing on  improvements in costs and quality;  (3) s ignificant
transaction-specific investments in plant, equipment, and human capital as well as to
share valuable technical information; (4) substantial involvement of suppliers in product
development with intensive and regular sharing of technical and cost information to
improve quality.
Supplier relations in the U.S. are changing rapidly and are moving close to those in
Japan. In the U.S., suppliers are becoming significantly more likely to provide detailed
information to their customers, have long-term contracts, make efforts in improving
costs and quality. These results indicate progress toward collaborative relationships, in
                                                  
18 In the U.K. automobile industry the traditional buyer-supplier relationship was promised on stable, high
volume, low variety production; relationship was one of close competition, with any new business secured
by one supplier being won at bidding; price was the primary criterion on which contracts were awarded.
Today, one can notice that several automakers are trying to shift toward reducing costs, and resolving
scheduling problems, technical difficulties and the like through a process of cooperation rather than
competition. The new relationship was characterized by far greater dependency as it involved suppliers in
design, research and development work, and quality control, and this in turn facilitated more commitment
from suppliers by allowing them to engage in more forward planning. Reducing the supplier base is one
feature of the current transformation, long-term collaborative contracts awarded to a limited number of
suppliers, and buying more assembled component systems rather than individual components. However,
the structure of the U.K. vehicle industry presents severe technology transfer and to the close
collaboration between buyers and suppliers. There is a largely independent and common first-tier of
suppliers, as well as a common secondary/tertiary tier, which are shared by a number of vehicle
assemblers (Turnbull, et al., 1992).24
which suppliers play an important role in solving problems and developing ideas about
products and processes technology. Therefore, there has been a limited, yet noticeable,
convergence in the nature of U.S. and Japanese supplier relations.
  Despite many empirical studies on supplier relations,  particularly in automobile
industry, many empirical and theoretical problems are still left unknown. Can we identify
same characteristics in supplier relations across industries in Japan compared with the
U.S. counterpart?  Whether  can  the Japanese practices be unique to the peculiar
circumstances of the Japanese social system?  Future research needs to provide
empirical analysis based on different perspectives to gain insights.
  How efficient Japanese supplier relations can be? Research need to combine the
viewpoints of both automakers and suppliers. This analysis could lead to a better picture
of how supplier relations as a whole affect efficiency and innovation in product
development and production of automobile industry. Furthermore, theoretical models
can be required to explain how efficient those relations can be.
  To what extent can the nature of supplier relations in different countries converge?腀 We
know that each automakers attempt to seek more efficient way to manage supplier
relations that work effectively in different countries. We need to continue to study how
the circumstances affect characteristics of supplier relations in different countries to
calibrate the likely patterns that supplier relations will converge in the future.
Generalizations on a convergent pattern of supplier relations need longitudinal studies
with multiple perspectives.25
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